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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
framed, the bench, bar and public may anticipate a determination
as to whether a constitutional right here exists.
William Erwin Barr
Corporations--Stock Granting Only Limited Power to Vote
For Directors Valid Under Constitutional Amendment
Ps, minority stockholders, seek to enjoin defendant corporation
from reducing the membership of the board of directors and to
require Ds to permit all stockholders to vote for all directors to
be elected. Defendant corporation has reduced the number of di-
rectors to be elected from eight to three; one director to be elected
by preferred stockholders, the remainder to be elected by holders
of common stock. Ps claim the charter of defendant corpora-
tion allowing stockholders limited power to vote for directors
is invalid and in conflict with W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4, as
amended in 1958. Held, the charter is valid and stock issued with
the right to vote for less than the number of directors to be elected
is constitutional. Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 122 S.E.2d
436 (W. Va. 1961).
The controlling question in the case was whether the 1958
Amendment to article XI, section 4 of the constitution effected a
change so as to allow preferred stockholders to elect one director
and allow common stockholders the exclusive right to elect other
directors, as provided by the corporate charter. The amended con-
stitution, with the amended portion italicized, now reads:
"The Legislature shall provide by law that every corpora-
tion, other than a banking institution, shall have power to issue
one or more classes and series within classes of stock, with or
without par value, with full, limited or no voting powers, and
with preferences and special rights and qualifications, and that
in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated com-
panies, every stockholder holding stock having the right to
vote for directors, shall have the right to vote, in person or by
proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for
as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected,
or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of
his shares of stock, shall equal, or to distribute them on the
same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit;
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and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
manner."
The amendment to the constitution was attacked on the ground
that its parts were in "irreconcilable conflict." The first part of the
amendment relates to the power of a corporation to issue stock with
full, limited, or no voting power. The second part of the amend-
ment relates to the cumulative manner in which persons "holding
stock having the right to vote" shall exercise that right, and provides
that persons holding stock with the right to vote shall vote for "as
many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected ...
and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
manner." The circuit court ruled that the part of the provision
allowing stock with limited voting power was in irreconcilable con-
flict with the provision granting holders of voting stock the right to
vote for "as many persons as there are directors or managers to
be elected." The circuit court then reasoned that the amendment
to article XI, section 4, did not alter or change the meaning of
the original constitutional provision which denied corporations the
right to issue stock without the power to vote for directors. The
charter provisions of the defendant corporation were accordingly held
invalid and unconstitutional, in that they gave the corporation the
right to issue stock with limited power to vote for directors.
The decision of the circuit court was reversed by the West
Virginia Supreme Court in the principal case. The court, in a four
to one decision, upheld the right of corporations to issue stock with
limited voting power, and held that a stockholder holding stock
which gives him a limited right to vote for directors can only vote
for the number of directors or managers as per the limitation, and
a stockholder who has the right to vote for only one director can-
not cumulate his shares for the reason that his vote for only one
director cannot be cumulated. The amendment was held to apply
to corporate charters in existence at the time of the ratification of
the amendment, and to all corporations subsequently created and
organized. The right of the defendant corporation to reduce the
number of directors to be elected was also upheld, as authorized
by the by-laws of the corporation and W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1,
§ 16 (Michie 1955). The majority opinion reasoned that there was
no irreconcilable conflict in the amendment to article XI, section 4,
but found the provisions unclear and ambiguous and thus subject to
interpretation. Great weight was given to the fact that the amend-
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ment was the last word of the people and the "object of construc-
tion, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the
intent of the people adopting it." May v. Toppens, 65 W. Va. 656,
64 S.E. 848 (1909). "A constitutional clause . . . should not be
construed so as to defeat the obvious intent of the people if an-
other construction equally in accordance with the words and sense
may be adopted which will enforce and carry out the intent" 11 AM.
Ju. Constitutional Law § 61 (1937).
The dissent in the principal case concluded that the language
in article XI, section 4, as amended, is clear and unambiguious,
and not subject to interpretation. It was agreed that a corporation
could issue stock without the power to vote for directors, but if
stock was issued with the right to vote for directors, then the holders
of that stock should have the right to vote for as many directors
or managers as are to be elected, and "such directors shall be
elected in no other manner."
Prior to the decision in State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement
Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W. Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171 (1956), the is-
suance of stock with limited or no voting power was granted in
W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 22 (Michie 1955), which expressly
empowered corporations to issue stock with full, limited, or no
voting power; and W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 66 (Michie 1955),
which allowed cumulative voting rights to holders of stock "entitled
to a vote." The Dewey case held these statutes unconstitutional and
in contravention of article XI, section 4 of the West Virginia Con-
stitution, and prohibited the Dewey Portland Cement Company from
issuing stock which did not grant stockholders the power to vote
in elections of directors. This case led to the adoption of the amend-
ment to article XI, section 4 and was followed by the legislative
re-enactment of the statutes declared invalid by the Dewey case.
For a discussion of the Dewey case see Comment, 59 W. VA. L.
REv. 374 (1957).
There have been cases deciding the question of non-voting
stock as a violation of a constitutional provision similar to article
XI, section 4, before amendment. The first such case arose in
State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872 (1905).
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Missouri
Constitution was only to guarantee to those shareholders having the
right to vote the right of cumulative voting, and non-voting agree-
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ments were agreements between classes of stockholders and not af-
fected by the constitutional provision. Mo. CONST. art. 12, § 6
(1875). A constitutional provision identical to article XI, section
4, before amendment, was construed in People v. Emmerson, 302
Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922). The Illinois court refused to follow
the Swanger case, supra, and held there could be no deprivation
of the voting right of any stockholder, based on ILL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3. This, in essence, was the decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court in the Dewey case, supra. In Brooks v. State, 27 Del. (3
Boyce) 1, 79 Atl. 790 (1911), a statute depriving stockholders of
their right to vote was also held unconstitutional. The constitutional
provision was subsequently repealed. These cases are discussed in
Comments, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 345 (1933), and 40 W. VA. L.Q. 97
(1933). In Nebraska a similar constitutional provision was enacted
in 1941, and that state has since refused to issue certificates of
corporation which deny stockholders the right to elect directors.
25 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1946). In both the Brooks and Emmerson
cases the contention was unsuccessfully made that the applicable
provisions concerned only stockholders who bought stock with the
right to vote, and guaranteed the right to elect directors only to
those persons. The West Virginia amendment expressly states that
"holders of stock having the right to vote" for directors shall be
guaranteed that right. There are apparently no cases where a pro-
vision like the amended article XI, section 4, of the West Virginia
Constitution has been construed to either permit or deny the is-
suance of stock which limits the power to vote for directors.
The court in the principal case stated that the holding therein
was not contrary to State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va.
315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958). In this case the by-laws of a transit
company provided that two of the five directors of the company
should be elected in one year, two to be elected two years there-
after and one four years thereafter. This case was decided under
article XI, section 4, before the ratification of the 1958 Amendment,
and concerned the right of stockholders to cumulate their votes.
The right of cumulative voting allows a voter to concentrate the
whole of his votes on one person or to distribute them among the
number of directors to be elected as he may see fit. If five directors
are to be elected, the elector may vote all five of his votes for each
share of stock he owns for one nominee. In this manner the
minority holders, by all concentrating their votes on selected per-
sons, are more certain of representation. However, the fewer the
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number of directors to be elected, the less the representation accorded
to a minority. The minority was entirely deprived of representation
in the Syphers case, and this was held to be in violation of article
XI, section 4, before amendment. This decision is criticized in
19 U. PrrT. L. REv. 806 (1958). The holding in the principal
case was expressly stated not to be contrary to the Syphers holding.
Now that it is constitutional to limit the power of stockholders to
vote for directors it is forseeable that the validity of staggered di-
rectorates will be litigated again.
The majority opinion in the principal case does operate to
serve the best interests of corporations doing business in West Vir-
ginia. Furthermore the decision sets at rest a confusion which has
existed some sixty years, and clearly gives a corporation the right
to issue stock giving holders "full, limited, or no voting powers"
in the election of directors or managers.
John Everett Busch
Federal Tax Lien-Effect of State Statute of Limitations
The United States brought an action to recover so much of a
debt owed to a delinquent taxpayer that would offset the tax de-
ficiency. The debtor contended that the state statute of limitations
had run against a preponderance of the obligation, W. VA. CODE
ch. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1955); therefore, the United States
was partially barred from recovery. Held, the statute of limita-
tions was tolled prior to the commencement of this action, and
the United States is entitled to all money not paid by the debtor
before notice of levy. United States v. Polan Indus., Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 333 (S.D. W. Va. 1961).
This decision held that the federal government was immune to
a state statute of limitations when enforcing a tax lien perfected
under federal law. The brunt of the debtor's argument was based
on the derivative nature of the government's claim. It asserted that
the government stepped into the shoes of the taxpayer and could
attain no greater rights than the taxpayer itself could claim. Thus,
the government could only stop the statute by starting suit. The
court admitted that the United States took the claim with all its
attendant infirmities. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414
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